The Best Time of Year to Defraud a Business

If you were planning to redirect a company's supplier payment, you would pick the third week of December.

Not because anyone is less competent then. Because every control that normally catches it depends on something the holidays remove.

What the holidays take away

The person who would have checked is away. Verification works because someone picks up a phone and speaks to a named contact they've dealt with before. In late December that contact is on leave, their colleague doesn't know you, and the switchboard goes to voicemail. The check doesn't fail — it just doesn't happen.

Urgency stops looking suspicious. In October, "this has to go today" invites a question. In the week before Christmas, everything has to go today. Genuine deadlines are real and everywhere, which gives a fabricated one perfect cover.

Out-of-office replies are a gift. They confirm who is away, for how long, and who is covering — which tells an attacker exactly who to target and exactly which authority figure is conveniently unreachable for confirmation.

Decisions move to people who don't normally make them. Approval thresholds get worked around because the usual approver is skiing. Junior staff are left holding payment runs they don't normally handle, with instructions to keep things moving.

Recall windows close. A fraudulent payment sent on 23 December may not be noticed until 5 January. By then the money has moved through several accounts and several jurisdictions, and recovery is, in practical terms, finished.

Volume is at its peak. Year-end payment runs, supplier settlements before the break, early payroll. More transactions, less scrutiny per transaction.

The two patterns to expect

Invoice redirection. An email from a supplier you've paid for years — correct branding, correct invoice reference, right tone — advising that their bank details have changed and asking for the imminent payment to go to the new account. Often supported by a convincing letterhead attachment.

The December variant adds a deadline: "Could this be processed before you close for Christmas? Our accounts team is away from the 22nd."

Executive impersonation. An email appearing to come from a director, often sent late in the day, asking for an urgent transfer and explaining they're travelling and can't be reached by phone. The holidays make "I'm away and unreachable" entirely plausible, which is the whole point.

Both rely on the same thing: making verification feel disproportionate when the request feels normal.

Five controls, and one sentence that matters more than the others

1. Verified callback on every change of bank details. No exceptions. Any change triggers a phone call to a number you already hold — never a number from the email requesting the change. Speak to a named person you've dealt with. Document it.

This stops the overwhelming majority of these attacks, and its effectiveness depends entirely on the "no exceptions" part. Every successful attack is an exception someone made under pressure.

2. Dual authorisation that doesn't get suspended for the holidays. If your threshold is £10,000 in November, it's £10,000 in December. The most dangerous sentence in any finance function this month is "we'll sort the paperwork in January."

3. Name a duty contact and tell everyone who it is. Before people go away, circulate who is reachable, on what number, between 21 December and 5 January, for the specific purpose of verifying a payment. Remove the excuse that nobody could be contacted.

4. Tighten out-of-office messages. Dates and a generic team inbox. Not who is covering, not their direct line, not "for urgent payment queries contact X on their mobile."

5. Put this in writing, this week, to everyone who touches payments:

No payment is ever urgent enough to skip verification. Nobody in this business will be criticised for delaying a payment to check it.

That second clause does more work than the first. Junior and temporary staff bypass controls because they are afraid of holding something up at the worst possible time of year, not because they are careless. Removing that fear is the single cheapest control available, and it costs one email.

If it happens

Speed is the only variable you control:

  1. Contact your payment provider immediately and request a recall. Hours matter. Funds still sitting in the receiving account are recoverable; funds moved on generally are not.

  2. Contact the receiving bank directly in parallel if you can.

  3. Report to Action Fraud and to your own bank's fraud team.

  4. Preserve the original emails with full headers — forwards strip the evidence.

  5. Assume it isn't isolated. If someone had visibility of your email, check other pending payments and other suppliers.

  6. Notify your insurer promptly. Cyber and crime policies have short notification windows, and late notification is a common reason claims get declined.

Know your provider's recall process and out-of-hours contact before you need it. Finding out on 24 December what the escalation route is, is not a good use of 24 December.

The thing to do today

Send the sentence in control five to your finance team.

It takes two minutes, it costs nothing, and it is the only control on this list that works even when every other one has been quietly suspended for the holidays.

William Fuller, Co-Founder of Orbis Exchange Group contact on 0203 918 5622

Ben James, Co-Founder of Orbis Exchange Group contact on 0203 918 5621

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December Payroll: The One Month Where Being Late Really Matters