"We've Managed Fine So Far": Making the Internal Case for Hedging

Plenty of finance directors understand their currency exposure perfectly well and still can't get anything done about it.

The analysis isn't the obstacle. Getting a board, a founder or a managing director to approve the policy is — and the objections are consistent enough to prepare for.

Here are the five that come up, and what actually answers them.

"Hedging is gambling with the company's money"

The most common objection and the most straightforwardly wrong, but it needs answering carefully rather than dismissively.

The answer: gambling creates a risk that didn't exist before. Hedging removes a risk that already does.

A business with €2m of euro invoices due next year is already carrying a €2m currency position. It took that position by signing supply contracts, not by trading. The only question is whether it keeps the position or closes it.

The framing that lands: doing nothing is the speculative choice. An unhedged business has, in effect, decided that leaving several hundred thousand pounds of margin exposed to a market it doesn't follow is prudent. Put like that, the burden of proof moves.

"We've been fine so far"

Usually true, and the reason it's dangerous.

The answer: survival isn't evidence of control. A business that has been unhedged through a period of relative stability has been lucky, not careful — and has no idea how large its exposure is because it has never been tested.

The useful move here is arithmetic, not argument. Show what the last three years would have looked like at the extremes of the actual rate range in that period. Not a forecast — history. "If we'd bought our euros in October 2022 rather than August, this is what it would have cost."

Then show the sensitivity: what a 10% move does to operating profit today, on today's exposure. If the business has grown, the exposure has grown, and "fine so far" was measured on a smaller number.

"We'll miss out if rates improve"

Legitimate, and it deserves a straight answer rather than a deflection.

The answer: yes. A forward contract means you don't benefit if the market moves your way. That's the trade — certainty costs optionality.

Three responses:

  1. Partial hedging. Cover 70% and leave 30% open. You capture some upside and cap most of the downside. For boards nervous about "locking in", this is usually the proposal that gets approved.

  2. Options. Pay a premium, keep the upside, retain full protection. More expensive, and it directly answers the objection.

  3. Reframe the objective. The business isn't trying to profit from currency. It's trying to protect a margin it has already earned commercially. Upside on an exchange rate isn't a business objective — nobody's strategy document says "make money on GBP/EUR".

That last point is the one that tends to settle it with a commercially minded board.

"It's too complicated / we don't have the resource"

The answer: the policy fits on three pages and the execution is a phone call.

Hedge ratios by time band, permitted instruments, authorisation limits, review cycle. That's the policy. Once it exists, booking a forward takes minutes and the quarterly reporting is one page.

The complexity objection is usually about unfamiliarity rather than workload. Offering to run a single hedge on one known exposure as a pilot — one contract, one payment date — removes most of it. People find the mechanics anticlimactic.

"What if we hedge and then don't need the currency?"

A real risk, and worth taking seriously because mishandling it creates the horror story that prevents hedging for a decade.

The answer: match the instrument to the certainty of the cash flow.

  • Committed exposure (signed contracts, confirmed orders) → forwards

  • Probable but uncertain (tenders, pipeline, conditional deals) → options

  • Flexible timing → market orders

And hedge forecast exposure at lower ratios than committed exposure. That's exactly what the layered framework exists for.

The failure mode isn't hedging. It's hedging an uncertain exposure with a certain instrument, which is a product-selection error rather than an argument against the whole approach.

Three things that help the proposal land

Lead with the sensitivity, not the solution. Open with "a 10% move costs us £340,000 of operating profit" rather than "I'd like to discuss forward contracts". Establish the problem before proposing the answer.

Bring the policy, not the idea. A draft policy with proposed ratios is a document to approve. An idea is a conversation to postpone.

Name what you're not asking for. Explicitly rule out speculation. "This policy permits hedging only against identified underlying exposure and prohibits positions taken for gain." One sentence that removes most of the room for objection — and it should be in the policy regardless.

The honest caveat

Some businesses genuinely shouldn't hedge much. If exposure is small relative to profit, if you can reprice quickly, or if customers absorb currency movement, the cost and effort may exceed the benefit.

That's a legitimate conclusion, and reaching it deliberately is the goal. What isn't legitimate is having no position because nobody ever put the numbers in front of the people who decide.

William Fuller, Co-Founder of Orbis Exchange Group contact on 0203 918 5622

Ben James, Co-Founder of Orbis Exchange Group contact on 0203 918 5621

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Your Currency Requirement Has a Season

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One Page, Five Numbers: FX Reporting That Directors Can Use